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Export Diversifications and Exchange-rate Regimes: Evidences 
from 72 Developing Countries  
Abstract: Drawing on a new dataset of diversification of export products, the paper 
makes the first attempt in the empirical literature to test the impact of product 
diversification on the choice of exchange-rate regimes in a sample of 72 developing 
countries (1974-2010). The paper finds that diversification of export products has a 
positive but insignificant effect on the choice of fixed exchange-rate regimes. When 
export diversification is decomposed into the extensive and intensive margins, 
evidences of the paper show that higher level of product diversification at the 
extensive margin has a statistically positive effect on exchange-rate regime choices 
while the intensive margin has a negative but insignificant impact on the choice.   
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1. Introduction 
In view of the traditional or old theories of trade trying to explain trade flow between 
countries in terms of comparative advantage, the expansion of existing products 
(intensive margin) is the only access to trade growth. The new trade theory 
incorporating imperfect competition and increasing returns since the early 1980s, 
however, argues that increases in the number of products (extensive margin) drive 
trade growth. Both theories assuming away differences among firms (assuming a 
representative firm), are inconsistent with a large number of empirical evidences 
about the important role firms playing in mediating countries’ imports and exports 
since the mid 1990s. The challenges from new evidences posing for both traditional 
and the new trade theory have embarked on a series of heterogeneous-firm models 
which might be called the “new new” trade theory①.  
The “new new” trade theory argues that a country’s trade may grow either at the 
intensive or the extensive margins (Melitz, 2003). The theory increasingly shifts 
economists’ focus on countries and industries to firms and products. This shift also 
sparks a wealth of empirical literature examining export growth and diversification by 
decomposing export diversification into extensive and intensive margins. The 
decomposition has given birth to many new yet interesting findings in the literature 
and deepens our understanding on the driving forces of export growth (Hummels and 
Klenow, 2005), the evolution of export diversification patterns (Cadot et al., 2011), 
the relationship between export diversification and economic growth (Cadot et al., 
2013), and the relation between exchange rate uncertainty and export growth (Lin, 
2007; Bergin and Lin, 2008), etc.  
The choice of exchange rate regimes is also an important but controversial topic 
in international economics that remains open. Traditional theory of exchange-rate 
regimes argues that export diversification is a potential determinant of the choice 
(Kenen, 1969; McKinnon, 1969). However, empirical evidences in the past 40 years 
focusing intensively on the diversification of trading partners or export destinations 
                                                        
① Baldwin (2005) and Bernard et al. (2007) are two recent surveys of the “new new” trade theory. 
 2
are mixed (Table 1). Product diversification of exports, the main focus of the 
traditional theory, seems largely missing in the literature due to the unavailability of 
detailed data on export products. In addition, existing literature fails to decompose 
diversification, be it trading partners or sectors, into the intensive and extensive 
margins and therefore may miss some important insights into the topic.  
The paper examines the role of product diversification of export on the choice of 
exchange rate regimes in developing countries using a new dataset of product 
diversification which decomposes export diversification into the extensive and the 
intensive margins. The paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt in recent decades to examine product 
diversification on the choice of exchange rate regimes since Holden et al. (1977).  
Second, the paper provides new evidences regarding the effect of export 
diversification covering the intensive and the extensive margins on the choice of 
exchange-rate regimes. In particular, the paper finds that diversification of export 
products has a positive but insignificant effect on the choice of fixed exchange-rate 
regimes. When export diversification is decomposed into the extensive and intensive 
margins, the paper finds that more diversification of export products at the extensive 
margin has a statistically positive effect on exchange-rate regime choices while the 
intensive margin has a negative but insignificant impact on the choice. The two 
opposing effects may cancel out when combined, leading to an insignificant effect of 
the overall indicator of export diversification on the choice of regimes①. The paper’s 
findings cast new insights on the traditional topic in international finance, the choice 
of exchange-rate regimes, and may explain the mixed results of empirical evidences 
in the past several decades as well. The finding also helps to understand which margin 
seems to be a stronger driver of exchange-rate regime choices in developing countries. 
It is therefore of vital importance for the design of exchange rate polices and export 
policies in developing countries.  
                                                        
① In addition, the paper’s findings may also sparks rethinking on the role of diversification, 
and more specifically, the extensive margin of product diversification, on the choice of exchange 
rate regimes in the framework of the “new new ” trade theory.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys literature related. 
Section 3 offers empirical evidences on the role of export diversification on the choice 
of exchange rate regimes using a sample of 72 developing countries spanning from 
1974 to 2010. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
It is claimed that “highly diversified economies are viewed as better candidates for 
currency areas than less-diversified economies since the diversification provides some 
insulation against a variety of shocks, forestalling the need of frequent changes in 
terms of trade via the exchange rate (Tavlas, 1993).” The argument could be dated 
back as early as to the 1960s. In discussing the optimum currency area, Kenen (1969, 
p49) points out, 
“A country that engages in a number of activities is also apt to export a wide 
range of products. Each individual export may be subject to disturbances, whether 
due to changes in external demand or in technology. But if those disturbances are 
independent, consequent on variations in the composition of expenditure or output, 
rather than massive macroeconomic swings affecting the entire export array, the law 
of large numbers will come into play. At any point in time, a country can expect to 
suffer significant reversals in export performance, but also enjoy significant 
success. …. From the standpoint of external balance, taken by itself, economic 
diversification, reflected in export diversification, serves, ex ante, to forestall the need 
for frequent changes in the terms of trade and therefore, for frequent changes in 
national exchange rates.” 
Kenen’s (1969) arguments imply that product diversification makes fixed 
exchange rates most appropriate to well-diversified economies. The argument was 
quickly responded and questioned by McKinnon (1969, p112) who argued that,  
“Kenen’s main conclusion could be put as follows: the more diversified an 
economy the stronger the case for fixed exchanger rates. However, the more 
diversified an economy, the larger it is, and, because it is diversified, the smaller the 
foreign trade sector. Therefore, Kenen’s conclusions imply that a lager diversified 
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economy with small foreign sector should have fixed exchange rates whereas small 
open economies should adhere to floating rates. ” 
Do empirical evidences support Kenen’s argument or McKinnon’s argument? As 
a matter of fact, empirical evidences are quite mixed (Table 1). More importantly, 
extant empirical literature focuses specifically on diversification of trade partners or 
geographical diversification and sectoral diversification. Only one exception, Heller 
(1978), finds that an economy with higher level of product diversification is more 
likely to be associated with a flexible exchange rate.  
In recent years, the development of the “new new” trade theory shifts 
economists’ focuses on countries and industries emphasized by the traditional and 
new trade theory to both the extensive and intensive margins of trade. And thanks to 
the more disaggregated data on trade flows, economists are in a position to study trade 
diversification empirically along both margins. The development in trade theory and 
empirics also inspires economists’ renewed interests on the effect of diversification on 
the choice of exchange-rate regimes.  
One important yet recent contribution to the literature is Chowdhury et al. (2014) 
who find that diversification is associated with flexible regimes in countries 
experiencing greater external shocks. The contribution of Chowdhury et al. (2014), is 
they make the first attempt in literature to empirically explore the role of sector 
diversification (rather product diversification) on the choice of exchange rate regimes 
using the Theil index to measure sectoral diversification and decomposing sectoral 
diversification into intensive and extensive margins. The decomposing approach they 
use is also similar to Cadot et al. (2011) which is an innovative application of the 
Theil index decomposing export diversification into the intensive and extensive 
margins of trade.  
Inspired by both developments in trade theory and Chowdhury et al. (2014), the 
paper, using a new dataset of products diversification developed by the IMF, attempts 
to present new empirical evidences on the relation between diversification of export 
products and the choice of exchange-rate regimes in developing countries. The 
primary purpose of the paper aims at providing some insights into the traditional topic 
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and sparks renewed interests in the field.  
3. Empirical Evidences 
3.1 Model specification 
To test the impact of export diversification on the choice of exchange-rate regimes, 
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Where, TtNi LL ,2,1;,,2,1 == . In equation (1), iteer is a dummy variable 
which is assigned one if country i  is a fixer at time t  and zero otherwise. exdit is 
the level of export diversification of country i  at time t . The indicator, as discussed 
below, is a Theil index measuring a country’s level of export product diversification. 
In regressions, we use the overall, extensive and intensive indices to estimate the 
impact of different dimensions of diversification on the choice of exchange rate 
regimes. The coefficient, 1α , according to the above discussions, is indeterminate. 
The variables jitcontrol  are control variables. iγ is the country-fixed characteristics. 
It is captured by two dummies for landlocked country and colonial origins. The 
landlocked dummy accounts for the geographic features of a country which may 
affect its production diversification. The colonial origin dummy captures the historical 
factor that may also affect the current production structure (Harms and Hoffmann, 
2011; Chowdhury et al. 2014). tζ  is the aggregate time effects captured by 
year-dummies and itε  is the error term.  
    We will first estimate the equation (1) by OLS. One advantage of the linear 
probability model (LPM) is it does not depend on a particular assumption about the 
distribution of the error term. The other advantage of the model is it is easy to 
interpret the regression coefficients. However, the model also has an unattractive 
property that the fitted values of the dependent variable, the probability that a country 
adopt a fixed regime, do not necessarily fall into the interval between zero and unity. 
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Alternatively, we will also estimate a probit regression which is based on the latent 
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Following Carmignani et al. (2008), Frieden et al. (2010), Levy-Yeyati, et al. 
(2010), Harms and Hoffmann (2011), Chowdhury et al. (2014) and Méon and Minne 
(2014), we lagged all explanatory and control variables one period to avoid or reduce 
possible endogeneity problem.  
3.2 Data 
We use a panel dataset covering 72 developing countries (1974-2010) to estimate the 
effect of export diversification has on the choice of exchange rate regimes. Countries 
are listed in Table A1. Our data consists of three parts. First, the classification of 
exchange-rate regimes forms the basis of our dependent variables. Second, indicators 
of export diversification form our explanatory variables. Third, other economic and 
political variables consist of the control variables. Table A2 lists the name, meaning 
and source of each variable in the paper. 
3.2.1 The classification of exchange-rate regime and the dependent variable 
There are basically two schemes in classifying exchange rate regimes. One is the de 
jure classification in which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies its 
member countries’ exchange rate regimes based on their official notifications to the 
Fund. The classifications are documented in the Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions compiled by the IMF. Until the late 1990s, 
most previous empirical studies have relied on the IMF’s de jure classification dataset.  
The IMF’s classification, however, suffers from many shortcomings. In practice, 
de facto exchange-rate regimes often differ from what they were announced to be. In 
one case, some de jure fixers devalue frequently. In the other, many de jure floaters 
try to keep exchange rates in a narrow band. Recognizing these drawbacks, the IMF 
                                                        
① Usually, both logit and probit models yield very similar results. 
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and many economists have proposed new exchange-rate regime classifications based 
on information of actual exchange rates and (or) official exchange market 
interventions. The new classification schemes are thus labeled as de facto or behavior 
classification. Typical examples in this line include Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, RR 
classification hereafter), Shambaugh (2004, SH hereafter), and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005, LYS classification hereafter). Using datasets of the RR and other 
de facto classifications, more and more economists reexamine some important 
problems in the field ranging from the evolution of exchange-rate regimes and the 
determinant of exchange-rate regime choices to the relation between exchange-rate 
regimes and macroeconomic performances.  
For the sake of a more comprehensive and systematic valuation on the effect of 
export diversification on the choice of exchange-rate regimes, the paper uses three 
classifications including the RR, SH and IMF to define the dependent variable.  
A dichotomy approach is used in the paper classifying various exchange-rate 
regimes into fixed (or fixer) vs. non-fixed regimes (or more flexible regimes). The 
fixer includes four types of regimes ranging from “no separate legal tender”, “pre 
announced peg or currency board arrangement”, “pre announced horizontal band that 
is narrower than or equal to ±2%” to “de facto peg” in the RR classification or the 
IMF classification dataset①. The remaining eleven types of regimes are classified as 
non-fixed. The dependent variable, errit, takes the value of unity if any country/year 
observation falls into the fixed regime, and zero if otherwise.  
A novel aspect of the RR classification is that it creates “a new separate category 
for countries whose twelve-month rate of inflation is above 40 percent”. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) label it as freely falling (coded 14 in the classification). The episode 
accounts for 12.5% of the total observations in their sample which is 3 times that of 
free floating cases (4.5%). Therefore, in regressions using the RR classification, we 
actually generate two dependent variables with one including the freely falling 
(considered as non-fixed regimes) and the other excluding the case. In addition, the 
                                                        
① The classification of fixers is line with Rogoff et al. (2003), Harms and Kretschmann (2009), 
Singer (2010) and Steinberg and Malhotra (2014).  
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case “dual market in which parallel market data is missing” coded 15 in the RR 
classification is deleted from the sample.  
The SH classification classifies exchange rate regimes into fixed vs. non fixed 
regimes by determining whether the exchange rate stayed within ±2% percent bands 
against the base currency. To prevent breaks in the peg status due to one-time 
realignments, Shambaugh also considers cases of exchange rate that had a percentage 
change of zero in eleven out twelve months as fixed①. The dependent variable, errit, 
takes the value of unity if any country/year observation in the SH classification equals 
unity (indicating a fixed rate), and zero if otherwise.  
The reason we do not use the LYS and other classifications is worth more 
discussions. First of all, the dataset of the LYS classification has a much shorter time 
period covering from 1974-2004 compared to the three classifications used in the 
paper. Second, and more importantly, the LYS and other classifications rely heavily 
on changes of international reserves and official exchange rates. On the one hand, the 
use of international reserves has considerable limitations. For example, changes in 
international reserves may be caused by exchange rate changes, or interests paid, or 
asset prices changes. So reserve is a noisy indicator and therefore may not reflect a 
country’s actual exchange-rate behaviors. Also, the use of reserves in the LYS 
classification gives rise to many cases of “one classification variable not available.” 
On the other hand, official exchange rates may be misleading in cases of dual or 
multiple rates. “In the developing world, such practices (dual or multiple rates) 
remained commonplace through the 1980s and 1990s and into the present (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2004, pp. 3).” In the presence of dual or multiple rates, 
market-determined exchange rate is a better indicator of the underlying monetary 
policy than the official exchange rate (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).  
3.2.2 Explanatory variables  
The indicator for export diversification comes from the dataset developed by the IMF 
covering indices of diversification across products and trading partners. Using an 
                                                        
① Shambaugh (2004, pp.317) points out that “the decision of 1 percent compared with 2 percent 
bands and the decision to include single peg breaks do not influence the results substantially.”  
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updated version of UN-NBER dataset, which harmonizes COMTRADE bilateral trade 
flow data at the 4-digit SITC level, the IMF calculates the overall, extensive and 
intensive Theil indices following the definitions and methods employed in Cadot et al. 
(2011). The overall Theil index is the sum of the extensive and intensive components. 
Diversification itself is defined by the IMF dataset as the shift to a more varied 
production structure, involving the introduction of new or expansion of pre-existing 
products, including higher quality products. The extensive margin of export 
diversification reflects an increase in the number of export products while the 
intensive margin considers the shares of export volumes across active products. 
Higher values of each index, however, indicate lower level of diversification, and vice 
versa①.  
Figure 1 witnesses a much stable and slower moving of the intensive margin of 
export diversification which dominates the action of export growth in the sample 
periods. It is also revealed by the figure that both the overall index and the extensive 
margin index have been gradually declining in the past 37 years, indicating a more 
diversification of export products in developing countries. The more diversified 
export in the sample countries is obviously owing to the growth at the extensive 
margin.  
【Figure 1 about here】 
3.2.3 Control variables 
The theory on the choice of exchange-rate regimes in the past 70years has identified 
that three types of factors, including factors of optimum currency area (OCA), 
macroeconomic and external factors, and political factors, are potentially fundamental 
determinants of a country’s choice of exchange-rate regimes. We therefore control for 
the three types of variables in our regressions which are briefly clarified as follows.  
OCA Factors 
The OCA theory was pioneered by Robert A. Mundell in 1961 (Mundell, 1961) and 
later extended by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). The theory relates a country’s 
                                                        
① Visit https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/dfidimf/diversification.htm or IMF (2014) for more 
detailed explanations on the indices. 
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economic characteristics, such as openness, factor mobility, and product 
diversification to a country’s choice of exchange rate regimes (Mundell, 1961; 
McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969). It is held that an economy with higher level of 
openness, diversification and facto mobility across borders tend to opt for a fixed rate.  
The extension of the theory also points out that economic development is an 
important contributor to the choice of exchange-rate regimes. Specifically, it is argued 
that less developed economies are more likely to be associated with fixed rates, and 
vice versa (Holden et al., 1979)①. In addition, it can be inferred from both McKinnon 
(1963) and Kenen (1969) that economic size is a potential determinant of the choice 
of exchange-rate regimes too. However, the effect of economic size on exchange-rate 
regime choices is ambiguous. On the one hand, larger economies are more diversified. 
This means that larger economies may be less open than small economies. Therefore, 
larger economies should float their exchange rates as suggested by McKinnon (1963). 
On the other hand, the criterion of Kenen (1969) suggests that larger economies with 
more diversified productions should fix their rates. 
Given the unavailability of data on factor mobility across countries, we use trade 
openness (the GDP share of exports plus imports, open), economic development (the 
logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita adjusted by PPP, ecodev) and economic size 
(the logarithm of a country’s GDP adjusted by PPP, ecosize) to control for the impact 
of OCA factors on the choice of exchange-rate regimes.  
Macro Economic and External Factors 
Inflation (inf). The impact of inflation on the choice of exchange-rate regimes is 
twofold. On the one hand, a country should not join in a currency area if inflation 
differentials between domestic and foreign countries are high. On the other hand, an 
economy with high inflation may probably fix its exchange rate to reduce inflation via 
the nominal anchor effect. We use the CPI indicator to measure inflation. Following 
                                                        
① Holden et al. (1979) points out that the OCA theory neglect the role of economic development 
on the choice of exchange-rate regimes. To the best of our knowledge, only Holden et al. (1979) 
has ever discussed or documented the role of what economic development plays on the choice of 
exchange-rate regimes.  
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Ghosh et al. (1997) and von Hagen and Zhou (2007), we divide inflation by one plus 
inflation to avoid bias caused by episodes of hyperinflation and higher inflations in 
our sample.  
International reserves (reserve). The more reserves a country has, the more 
possible it is to successfully fight back speculative attacks. It is therefore argued that 
the size of reserves is positively associated with the likelihood of a fixed exchange 
rate. We use M2/reserves to capture the impact of reserves have on the choice of 
exchange-rate regimes. 
External debt (exdebt). The theory of the first generation of currency crisis 
argues that fiscal deficit caused by expansionary fiscal policy is not consistent with a 
fixed rate since countries with more external debts may retire debts by expansionary 
fiscal policy. Therefore, an economy with more external debts is more likely to favor 
a floating rate. Another argument holds that a country with more external debts may 
be more likely to fix its exchange rate if large shares of external debts are 
denominated in foreign currencies. The two opposite arguments imply an ambiguous 
relation between external debts and the choice of exchange-rate regimes. To control 
for the effect of external debts on the choice of exchange rate regimes, we use 
external debts/GDP to proxy for a country’s external debts. 
Economic shocks. The Mundell-Fleming type model shows that economies with 
larger real shocks should allow more flexibility in exchange rates to stabilize output 
while those shocked by monetary disturbances should fix their exchange rates. 
Therefore, real shocks are negatively correlated with the likelihood of adopting fixed 
exchange-rate regimes while monetary shocks are positively associated with that 
likelihood. We use standard deviation of the logarithm of terms of trade over the 
previous five years and standard deviation of the growth rate of broad money supply 
in the previous five years to proxy for real (totshk) and monetary shocks (monshk) 
respectively (Levy-Yeyati, et al., 2010).  
Financial development (fd). In principle, developing countries with more 
underdeveloped financial systems are more likely to keep a stable exchange rate 
(Frieden et al., 2010; Lin and Ye, 2011; Berdiev et al. 2012). Following Frieden et al. 
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(2010), Lin and Ye (2011) and Berdiev et al. (2012), we use private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions/GDP to capture financial development.  
Capital account openness (kopen). The classic principle of impossible triangle 
states that only two of the three goals that most countries share—independence of 
monetary policy, stability in the exchange rate, and the free movement of capital—can 
be reached simultaneously. Therefore, given substantive capital flows across countries, 
a country has to either fixes its exchange rate or floats its exchange rate. A recent 
literature holds that a country with higher level of capital account openness should fix 
its exchange rate (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2010). The argument points out that currency 
depreciations or devaluations in developing countries may worsen balance sheets and 
investment of private sectors since these sectors have substantive liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies. Therefore, devaluations are not expansionary as 
what have been documented in textbooks but contractionary in these economies due 
to liability dollarization. Consequently, a more open capital account may lead 
policymakers in these economies to stabilize exchange rates to avoid contractionary 
effects of devaluations (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2010). In a word, the effect of capital 
account openness on the choice of exchange-rate regimes is not unambiguous either.  
We use Chinn and Ito (2006) index to measure capital account openness which is 
available for 182 economies covering the period of 1970-2010. Higher values of the 
index imply higher overall level of capital account openness. 
Political Factors 
Since the mid 1990s, politics has been introduced into the field of exchange-rate 
regime choices. Literature in this strand shows that political factors including 
democracy and political instability are important in determining the choice of 
exchange rate regimes. To control the impacts of politics on the choice of 
exchange-rate regimes, we include two political variables—democracy and political 
instability—in our regressions.  
Democracy (demo). Some political scientists argue that democratic governments 
are more easily subject to the influence of interest groups and it is difficult for 
democratic governments to take actions which are not supported by social and 
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political groups to defend a fixed exchange rate. Therefore, compared to autocratic 
governments, democratic governments are more likely to prefer floating exchange 
rates (Bernhard and Leblang, 1999; Broz, 2002; Bearce and Hallerberg, 2011). Other 
political scientists aruge that democratic governments may be more likely to fix 
exchange rates in an attempt to be immune to the influence of interest groups on 
policymaking.  
Political instability (polin). Some literature argues that politically instable 
countries may enhance governments’ credibility by committing to fixing exchange 
rates. Others, on the contrary, argue that breaking from a promise to maintain a 
currency peg is highly visible and politically costly relative to gradual depreciations 
under a floating regime. “Therefore, where political instability is high, governments 
with tenuous political support and short time horizons will be less likely to choose a 
fixed exchange-rate regime ex ante (Broz, 2002, pp. 875).”  
We use Polity 2 indicator from Polity IV database to proxy for democracy. The 
Polity 2 indicator is an aggregate index indicating the openness of domestic political 
institutions with values ranging from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). A higher 
value of the indicator means a higher degree of democracy. We use ACTOTAL 
indicator from major episodes of political violence databank (MEPV) to capture 
political instability. The indicator contains factors that may result in a country’s 
political instability. These factors include regional conflicts and violence events 
within a country, domestic social conflicts (such as ethic conflicts), international 
conflicts and wars etc.  
3.3 Empirical evidences 
3.3.1 Baseline results 
Results of the baseline LPM and probit models are listed in Table 2-1 to Table 2-3. It 
is revealed that the overall indicator of export diversification has a positive effect on 
the choice of fixed exchange-rate regimes, implying that less diversified economy of 
export products (higer values of the indicator) tend to adopt fixed exchange-rate 
regimes. But, the effect is not statistically significant at standard confidence level.  
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One advantage of using the Theil index to measure export or trade diversification 
is the index can be decomposed into the extensive and intensive margins. The overall 
indicator is the sum of indices of extensive and intensive margins. We therefore rerun 
the baseline regressions by decomposing the overall index into two margins. Results 
of Table 2-2 and 2-3 show that the extensive margin has a statistically positive effect 
on exchange-rate regime choices, implying that a more diversified economy at the 
extensive margin is more likely to adopt non-fixed regimes, while the intensive 
margin has a negative but insignificant impact on the choice. Therefore, the reason 
that the overall indicator has no statistical impact on the choice of exchange-rate 
regimes may owe to the facts that these two opposing effects may cancel out when 
combined. 
【Table 2-1 to Table 2-3 about here】 
A country’s export would be more easily subject to external shocks and therefore 
be more volatile if the country’s export grows predominantly at the intensive margin 
under which export concentrates on relatively a few firms and products. In addition, 
“if larger economies intensively export more of each variety, the prices of their 
national varieties should be lower on the world market (Hummels and Klenow, 2005, 
pp704).”  The lower prices in turn may lead to the deterioration of terms of trade and 
the trap of immiserizing growth. On the contrary, the likelihood that a reverse effect 
of terms of trade would be greatly reduced if a country’s export grows at 
predominantly the extensive margin. The more diversified extensive margin of export 
imply a more diversified production structure of the country in consideration, much 
stronger competition of firms in international market, and less impact of external 
shocks on export. Therefore, developing countries with higher level of diversification 
at the extensive margin are more likely to allow more flexibility in exchange rates.  
We not turn our focus to the quantitative effect of the extensive margin on the 
choice of exchange-rate regimes. Results ofg OLS regressions in Table 2-2 reveal that 
a one percentage decrease in the extensive margin (implying more diversification of 
exports) tend to increase the likelihood of adopting a fixed regime by approximately 
0.18 to 0.27 percent point. In addition, we also calculate the average marginal effect 
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of the extensive margin indicator when running probit models. The results are very 
close to the coefficients in the OLS regressions①. In a word, the effect of the extensive 
margin on the choice of exchange-rate regimes is not only statistically positive but 
also quantitatively large.  
3.3.2 Robustness 
Endogneity 
It is quite possible that export diversification may be affected by exchange rate 
regimes. For example, Lin (2007) finds that exchange rate uncertainty has a negative 
effect on the extensive margin and a positive effect on the intensive margin, both of 
which are statistically significant. A further study confirms that currency unions have 
raised trade predominantly at the extensive margin while direct pegs have worked 
almost entirely at the intensive margin (Bergin and Lin, 2008). Cavallari and 
D′Addona (2013) find that the mean response of extensive margins in fixers is almost 
4 times as high as the response among floaters in the presence of a real shock. In case 
of a nominal shock, such as a one-standard deviation increase in the Federal Fund 
Rate, while extensive margins increase in both regimes and the more so for peggers, 
intensive margins decline in the sample of peggers. 
Therefore, we need to pay close attention to the problem of potential endogeneity 
in our regressions caused by reversal causation. To this end, we have lagged the 
explanatory variables one period in estimating the baseline models in equation (1) and 
(2). Using lagged regressors may mitigate the problem to some extent, but our 
estimates may still be biased. We therefore estimate an IV probit and the LPM using 
two stage least square estimation (2SLS). With the assumption that endogeneity is 
primarily due to reverse causation, we use the 10-year lag value of diversification as 
an instrument following Chowdhury et al. (2014). The much deeper lag is less likely 
to be contaminated by reverse causation.  
The F statistics in the first stage across all regressions are larger than 10 and 
significant at 1% confidence level②. The tests of exogeneity in regressions of the 
                                                        
① The results are 0.22, 0.19, 0.21 and 0.25 in the SH, IMF, RR and RR_D regressions.  
② The F statistics in the first stage are not reported in Table 3-1 to Table 3-3 (available upon 
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intensive margin on the choice of regimes using the IMF classification (the second 
column in Table 3-3) indicate that the intensive margin may be endogenous. 
Therefore, the 2SLS and IV probit estimations maybe preferred to the corresponding 
baseline model in the second column in Table 2-3. The results confirm a negative but 
statistically significant relation between the intensive margin of export and the choice 
of exchange-rate regimes. All the remaining results in Table 3-1 to Table 3-3 indicate 
that the overall indicator, the extensive margin and the intensive margin should be 
considered exogenous in regressions. The results again confirm our main conclusions 
drawn from the baseline models.  
【Table 3-1 to Table 3-3 about here】 
Alternative definition of fixed regime 
In this section, we also consider some regimes with more flexibility as fixers. Since 
both the IMF and the SH classifications fail to collapse exchange rate regimes into 
more detailed types, we use only the RR classification to redefine the dependent 
variable. Specifically, we consider two more flexible regime types, namely “pre 
announced crawling peg” and “pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to ±2” (coded 5 and 6 respectively in the RR classification) as fixers and rerun 
all the regressions again. We fail to find evidences against our main conclusions 
(Table 4-1 to Table 4-3).  
【Table 4-1 to Table 4-3 about here】 
Fixed and Random Effect Estimators 
Since the fixed-effects estimator will exclude information from those countries with 
time-invariant variables (Steinberg and Malhotra, 2014), it “is of little use in 
estimating variables that display limited variability over time, such as political and 
institutional variable (Carmignani et al., 2008, pp.1181).” In addition, Carmignani et 
al. (2008, pp. 1181) hold that a random effect estimator is also problematic when we 
investigate “a large number of countries and the sample cannot be considered as 
drawn from a large distribution”. Steinberg and Malhotra (2014) argue that pooled 
                                                                                                                                                               
requests). 
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probit estimator is more suitable than either the fixed-effect or random-effects 
alternatives when using binary models (Steinberg and Malhotra, 2014). The above 
arguments are reasons we use a pooled estimator to perform our baseline regressions. 
However, some economists also use both random-effects and fixed-effects estimator 
when exploring the determinants of exchange-rate regimes (for example, Calderón 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008). For the sake of the robustness, we also run regressions 
using panel probit with random effect and loti models with both random and fixed 
effects. Results in Table 5-1 to Table 6-3 are still in supportive of our conclusions.  
【Table 5-1 to 6-3 about here】 
Sample Variation 
We also check whether our results are driven by the early period covering the 1970s to 
1980s, limiting our focus on observations after 1985 and 1990 respectively. The 
results again lend additional credibility to our conclusions (Results are available upon 
requests).  
4. Conclusions 
Diversification is one of the long-standing debates in international economics. The 
traditional and new theories of trade seek to promote specialization to reap the 
benefits of comparative advantage, productivity gains and increasing returns on scale. 
Recent literature emphasizes the benefits of a growth payoff and a stability payoff 
produced by increased diversifications (Cadot et al. 2013; IMF, 2014). An implicit 
inference from the above discussions is export diversification may be considered as 
one of the key determinants of the choice of exchange-rate regimes. Despite of the 
compelling theoretical arguments, the effect of diversification of export products on 
exchange rate regimes has not been put to an empirical test in the previous literature.  
The paper, drawing on a newly-developed dataset of export diversification 
decomposed into the extensive and the intensive margins by the IMF, makes the first 
attempt in empirical literature to test the impact of product diversification on the 
choice of exchange-rate regimes and provide new evidences in the regard. The paper 
finds that diversification of export products has a positive but insignificant effect on 
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the choice of fixed exchange-rate regimes. Higher level of product diversification at 
the extensive margin has a statistically positive effect on exchange-rate regime 
choices while the intensive margin has a negative but insignificant impact on the 
choice. The results indicate that understanding which margin seems to be a stronger 
driver of exchange-rate regime choices is important not only for its own sake, but also 
for the design of both exchange-rate policies and export policies.  
One of the biggest problems that the paper fails to cover is to understand why 
and how exchange-rate regimes respond to different margins of diversification. 
Another problem of the paper concerns the endogeneity problem where we need to 
figure out more appropriate instrument variables to test the robustness of the relation 
between export diversification and the choice of regimes. We therefore would like to 
consider our results as a preliminary step towards a much deeper and better 
understanding of the effect of export diversification on exchange-rate regimes due to 
many problems remaining open or unsolved in the current paper.  
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Figure 1 Export diversification in developing countries (1974-2010) 
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Table 1 Summary of the literature related 
Authors Sample ERR classifications Measurement of export diversification 
Econometric 
model Conclusions 
Heller (1978) 86 countries (1976) IMF 
• Geographical diversification: The percentage of 






Holden et al. (1979) 76 countries (1974-1975) HHS index 
• Product diversification: the percentage of total 
exports accounted for by the largest export in terms 
of the two digit Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) 
• Geographical diversification: the percentage of 







Melvin (1985) 64 countries (1976-1978) IMF 
• Geographical diversification: the fraction of total 














Poirson (2001) 93 countries (1999) 
IMF; de facto 
classification 
• Sector diversification: share of manufacturing in 
value added 
• Geographical diversification: share of major trade 





Méon and Rizzo (2002) 125 countries (1980-1994) IMF 
• Geographical diversification: the percentage of the 
three largest export destinations Binary probit +^^ 
Markiewicz (2006) 23 transition economies IMF; RR 
• Geographical diversification: the ratio of exports 
from a transition economy to the EU to total 
exports to the world the country 




Authors Sample ERR classifications Measurement of export diversification 
Econometric 
model Conclusions 




• Geographical diversification: share of the largest 
trading partner in total trade 
Multinomial 
logit +^^; — 
Carmignani et al. (2008) 96 countries (1974-2000) RR; IMF 
• Geographical diversification: share of trade with 
the three largest export partners 
LPM；probit；
logit +^^; — 
Jin (2009) 50 countries (1975-2000) RR 
• Geographical diversification: exports to the largest 
trading partner as a share of total exports. Ordered probit —^^ 










Levy-Yeyati et al. 
(2010) 
183 countries 
(1974-2004) IMF; RR; LYS 
• Geographical diversification : the share of exports 






Chowdhury et al. (2014) 135 countries (1985-2006) RR 
• Sectoral diversification: Theil index based on 
sectoral value added and sectoral employment 
shares 
• Decomposing the Theil index into within and 
between components 
LPM —^^ 
Note: 1. The symbol + means a more diversified economy is more likely to adopt a peg or is less likely to adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime; — 
indicates a more diversified economy is less likely to adopt a peg or is more likely to adopt a more flexible exchange rate.  
2. ^^ indicates regression coefficients are statistically significant in all or most cases, ^ indicates regression coefficients are significant in some 
specifications.  
3. HHS index is the index for estimating exchange-rate regime flexibility by Holden et al. (1979); IMF=IMF classification; RR=Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) classification; LYS=Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) classification. ERR indicates exchange-rate regimes.  
4. LPM stands for linear probability model.
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Table 2-1 Export diversification and exchange-rate regimes (overall indicator) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
LPM probit LPM probit LPM probit LPM probit 
0.051 0.195 0.034 0.127 0.037 0.163 0.046 0.179 exdiv 
(0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.17) 
0.068 0.305 0.081 0.197 0.211 0.707 0.237 0.799 open (0.15) (0.44) (0.15) (0.45) (0.16) (0.48) (0.16) (0.50) 
-0.026 -0.131 0.048 0.160 -0.083 -0.309 -0.095 -0.336 ecodev (0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.19) (0.07) (0.22) (0.07) (0.23) 
-0.045* -0.151 -0.061* -0.204* -0.014 -0.068 -0.016 -0.069 ecosize (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) 
-0.656*** -5.002*** -0.620*** -2.266*** -0.459*** -2.519** -1.134*** -3.543***inf (0.19) (1.40) (0.20) (0.77) (0.17) (1.00) (0.38) (1.35) 
0.004 0.017 0.003 0.005 -0.008 -0.025 -0.007 -0.021 reserve (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.095 -0.197 -0.013 -0.016 -0.168* -0.502 -0.159 -0.529 exdebt (0.10) (0.30) (0.11) (0.33) (0.10) (0.33) (0.11) (0.36) 
-0.277 -1.003 -0.241 -0.877 -0.212 -0.757 -0.255 -0.941 totshk (0.23) (0.70) (0.28) (0.84) (0.24) (0.77) (0.26) (0.80) 
0.153 0.490 0.128 0.361 0.231 0.764 0.216 0.884 monshk (0.24) (0.88) (0.23) (0.83) (0.28) (1.11) (0.29) (1.17) 
0.082 0.182 0.028 0.052 -0.105 -0.242 -0.150 -0.367 fd (0.26) (0.74) (0.29) (0.88) (0.27) (0.81) (0.27) (0.83) 
-0.058** -0.182** -0.043 -0.115 -0.018 -0.048 -0.024 -0.060 kaopen (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) 
-0.012* -0.042** -0.009 -0.028* -0.015** -0.053*** -0.017** -0.058***demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.023 -0.080 -0.018 -0.075 -0.033** -0.122** -0.030* -0.115* polin (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
N 1256 1256 1245 1245 1273 1273 1126 1126 
F statistics 4.51***  7.80***  2.56***  3.13***  
Adj. R2 0.211  0.227  0.190  0.200  
Wald Chi2  342.8***  212.9***  249.8***  267.3***
Pseudo R2  0.218  0.193  0.184  0.178 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies and 
constant are not reported. 
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Table 2-2 Export diversification and exchange-rate regimes (extensive margin) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
LPM probit LPM probit LPM probit LPM probit 
0.243*** 0.810*** 0.188** 0.643*** 0.235** 0.778*** 0.270*** 0.877***extmar 
(0.08) (0.27) (0.07) (0.24) (0.09) (0.30) (0.09) (0.32) 
0.147 0.545 0.156 0.464 0.291** 0.986** 0.315** 1.081**open (0.14) (0.43) (0.14) (0.45) (0.14) (0.49) (0.14) (0.49) 
-0.051 -0.193 0.023 0.116 -0.114* -0.414* -0.133** -0.460**ecodev (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.22) (0.07) (0.22) 
-0.038 -0.147 -0.051 -0.181 -0.001 -0.042 -0.006 -0.052 ecosize (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) 
-0.525** -4.742*** -0.505** -1.970** -0.311* -2.182** -0.909** -3.082**inf (0.20) (1.40) (0.20) (0.78) (0.18) (1.03) (0.36) (1.27) 
0.004 0.021 0.004 0.006 -0.008 -0.022 -0.006 -0.016 reserve (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.118 -0.325 -0.027 -0.077 -0.185* -0.623* -0.192* -0.691**exdebt (0.09) (0.29) (0.10) (0.31) (0.09) (0.32) (0.11) (0.35) 
-0.091 -0.349 -0.115 -0.499 -0.046 -0.198 -0.051 -0.321 totshk (0.24) (0.72) (0.28) (0.84) (0.26) (0.82) (0.28) (0.87) 
0.090 0.459 0.054 0.173 0.144 0.502 0.129 0.656 monshk (0.23) (0.87) (0.22) (0.81) (0.28) (1.12) (0.30) (1.21) 
0.132 0.285 0.081 0.0900 -0.018 -0.068 -0.030 -0.114 fd (0.26) (0.79) (0.31) (0.92) (0.28) (0.88) (0.29) (0.92) 
-0.049* -0.159** -0.036 -0.091 -0.007 -0.019 -0.014 -0.030 kaopen (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
-0.011** -0.046** -0.009 -0.032* -0.015** -0.056*** -0.017*** -0.062***demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.031** -0.109* -0.023 -0.095 -0.040*** -0.150** -0.037** -0.145**polin (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) 
N 1253 1253 1242 1242 1271 1271 1124 1124 
F statistics 6.41***  10.60***  2.79***  4.16***  
Adj. R2 0.248  0.249  0.231  0.248  
Wald Chi2  292.1***  323.0***  258.2***  193.9***
Pseudo R2  0.250  0.214  0.220  0.221 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies and 
constant are not reported. 
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Table 2-3 Export diversification and exchange-rate regimes (intensive margin) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
LPM probit LPM probit LPM probit LPM probit 
-0.046 -0.121 -0.042 -0.109 -0.055 -0.156 -0.057 -0.162 intmar 
(0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) 
0.098 0.377 0.100 0.249 0.237 0.780 0.262 0.868* open (0.15) (0.43) (0.15) (0.46) (0.16) (0.49) (0.16) (0.50) 
-0.016 -0.095 0.059 0.200 -0.074 -0.269 -0.084 -0.293 ecodev (0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.19) (0.07) (0.22) (0.07) (0.23) 
-0.060** -0.192** -0.074** -0.241** -0.028 -0.106 -0.031 -0.111 ecosize (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
-0.718*** -5.131*** -0.660*** -2.351*** -0.510*** -2.655*** -1.176*** -3.671***inf (0.20) (1.38) (0.20) (0.78) (0.18) (1.02) (0.39) (1.35) 
0.005 0.024 0.004 0.008 -0.007 -0.020 -0.006 -0.015 reserve (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.103 -0.239 -0.014 -0.035 -0.175* -0.540* -0.176 -0.575 exdebt (0.10) (0.30) (0.11) (0.32) (0.10) (0.32) (0.11) (0.35) 
-0.146 -0.557 -0.132 -0.515 -0.078 -0.328 -0.111 -0.479 totshk (0.25) (0.75) (0.28) (0.85) (0.27) (0.84) (0.29) (0.87) 
0.208 0.730 0.194 0.605 0.291 1.091 0.316 1.283 monshk (0.24) (0.90) (0.24) (0.86) (0.29) (1.13) (0.31) (1.21) 
-0.032 -0.194 -0.050 -0.196 -0.203 -0.594 -0.248 -0.721 fd (0.26) (0.73) (0.29) (0.87) (0.26) (0.81) (0.27) (0.82) 
-0.062** -0.196** -0.046 -0.125 -0.022 -0.059 -0.028 -0.071 kaopen (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
-0.015** -0.051*** -0.011* -0.033** -0.017*** -0.059*** -0.020*** -0.065***demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.021 -0.073 -0.015 -0.066 -0.032** -0.117** -0.028* -0.107* polin (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) 
N 1256 1256 1245 1245 1273 1273 1126 1126 
F statistics 4.54***  8.84***  2.76***  3.77***  
Adj. R2 0.210  0.228  0.193  0.202  
Wald Chi2  205.0***  227.3***  318.9***  263.1***
Pseudo R2  0.214  0.192  0.184  0.177 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies and 
constant are not reported. 
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Table 3-1 IV regressions (overall indicator) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit
-0.002 0.185 -0.063 -0.107 0.087 0.381 0.244** 0.912***exdiv 
(0.11) (0.38) (0.09) (0.30) (0.10) (0.38) (0.12) (0.35) 
0.076 0.169 0.104 0.206 0.188 0.570 0.232 0.866* open (0.17) (0.51) (0.18) (0.56) (0.18) (0.55) (0.15) (0.51) 
-0.003 -0.052 0.059 0.196 -0.102 -0.367 -0.201*** -0.766***ecodev (0.07) (0.25) (0.07) (0.23) (0.08) (0.28) (0.08) (0.26) 
-0.061* -0.173 -0.076** -0.244* 0.001 -0.013 0.018 0.024 ecosize (0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) (0.03) (0.13) (0.04) (0.16) 
-0.579*** -7.018*** -0.557** -2.119** -0.275* -2.047* -2.606*** -10.71***inf (0.21) (1.59) (0.23) (0.85) (0.16) (1.14) (0.49) (2.11) 
0.003 0.010 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.019 -0.004 -0.009 reserve (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.065 -0.030 0.015 0.118 -0.209* -0.653 -0.163 -0.588 exdebt (0.12) (0.40) (0.12) (0.37) (0.11) (0.40) (0.13) (0.45) 
-0.154 -0.754 -0.118 -0.704 -0.329 -1.129 -0.527* -1.962**totshk (0.28) (0.97) (0.33) (1.06) (0.28) (0.95) (0.29) (0.94) 
0.039 0.067 0.180 0.411 0.068 0.053 -0.256 -1.595 monshk (0.26) (1.09) (0.24) (0.94) (0.28) (1.21) (0.29) (1.02) 
0.199 0.605 0.044 0.175 0.117 0.479 0.219 0.941 fd (0.31) (0.94) (0.33) (1.02) (0.29) (0.98) (0.30) (1.02) 
-0.061** -0.179** -0.058* -0.150 -0.007 -0.003 0.016 0.074 kaopen (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
-0.015** -0.045** -0.016** -0.050** -0.015** -0.050** -0.012* -0.048**demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.022 -0.092 -0.009 -0.049 -0.035** -0.132* -0.021 -0.076 polin (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) 
N 927 927 936 936 945 945 722 722 
Wald Chi2 343.7*** 440.1*** 239.7*** 127.9*** 201.2*** 429.3*** 368.0*** 506.3***
Adj. R2 0.231  0.229  0.191  0.278  
Tests of 
exogeneity 0.722 0.915 0.134 0.232 0.857 0.727 0.271 0.254 
First stage results of lagged 10-year diversification on current indicator 
0.484*** 0.484*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.546*** 0.546*** 0.505*** 0.505***exdiv_10 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies and 
constant are not reported. 
5.Numbers in the row of “Tests of exogeneity” are p values of DWH test in the 
2sls-LPM and Wald test in the IV probit model respectively.  
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Table 3-2 IV regressions (extensive margin) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit
0.261** 0.937** 0.191a 0.666* 0.248* 0.824* 0.347*** 1.195**extmar 
(0.13) (0.45) (0.12) (0.39) (0.14) (0.48) (0.13) (0.47) 
0.147 0.418 0.172 0.458 0.289* 0.903 0.341** 1.299**open (0.16) (0.53) (0.17) (0.58) (0.17) (0.57) (0.13) (0.51) 
-0.038 -0.100 0.008 0.081 -0.121 -0.423 -0.180*** -0.709***ecodev (0.07) (0.24) (0.06) (0.22) (0.08) (0.27) (0.07) (0.26) 
-0.046* -0.181* -0.048 -0.184 0.001 -0.039 -0.019 -0.116 ecosize (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.14) 
-0.378* -6.419*** -0.352* -1.618* -0.155 -1.641 -2.050*** -9.100***inf (0.20) (1.51) (0.21) (0.84) (0.17) (1.11) (0.53) (2.26) 
0.004 0.018 0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.009 0.000 0.014 reserve (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) 
-0.113 -0.304 -0.0250 -0.0240 -0.265** -0.964** -0.294** -1.146**exdebt (0.12) (0.43) (0.12) (0.37) (0.11) (0.44) (0.13) (0.48) 
0.017 0.096 -0.096 -0.498 -0.098 -0.222 -0.058 -0.335 totshk (0.29) (0.94) (0.34) (1.05) (0.32) (0.98) (0.36) (1.15) 
-0.048 -0.013 0.050 0.113 0.047 0.080 -0.140 -0.957 monshk (0.23) (0.99) (0.23) (0.90) (0.26) (1.11) (0.24) (0.97) 
0.349 0.873 0.233 0.573 0.141 0.481 0.155 0.490 fd (0.29) (0.95) (0.34) (1.06) (0.29) (1.00) (0.33) (1.20) 
-0.045* -0.140* -0.042 -0.103 -0.000 0.011 0.005 0.046 kaopen (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
-0.013** -0.048** -0.014** -0.047** -0.016*** -0.058*** -0.019*** -0.073***demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.027* -0.110 -0.014 -0.0650 -0.035** -0.137* -0.017 -0.063 polin (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) 
N 923 923 932 932 942 942 720 720 
Wald Chi2 319.6*** 540.8*** 255.7*** 148.6*** 235.5*** 387.5*** 880.7*** 1986***
Adj. R2 0.282  0.265  0.239  0.338  
Tests of 
exogeneity 0.810 0.987 0.887 0.724 0.780 0.804 0.726 0.771 
First stage results of lagged 10-year diversification on current indicator 
0.577*** 0.577*** 0.635*** 0.635*** 0.607*** 0.607*** 0.585*** 0.585***extmar_10 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. a=11.7%.  
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies and 
constant are not reported. 
5.Numbers in the row of “Tests of exogeneity” are p values of DWH test in the 
2sls-LPM and Wald test in the IV probit model respectively.  
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Table 3-3 IV regressions (intensive margin) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit 2sls-LPM IV probit
-0.163 -0.417 -0.196** -0.555* -0.067 -0.165 0.025 0.133 intmar 
(0.10) (0.33) (0.10) (0.29) (0.10) (0.35) (0.11) (0.38) 
0.161 0.406 0.192 0.447 0.230 0.669 0.250 0.899 open (0.17) (0.50) (0.18) (0.53) (0.18) (0.56) (0.17) (0.58) 
0.014 0.022 0.066 0.239 -0.071 -0.238 -0.124 -0.460 ecodev (0.07) (0.24) (0.06) (0.21) (0.08) (0.27) (0.08) (0.30) 
-0.084*** -0.262** -0.092*** -0.297** -0.0270 -0.105 -0.024 -0.105 ecosize (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.15) 
-0.600*** -6.779*** -0.524** -1.925** -0.356** -2.217* -2.589*** -10.49***inf (0.19) (1.58) (0.21) (0.83) (0.16) (1.22) (0.56) (2.16) 
0.005 0.021 0.005 0.010 -0.004 -0.011 -0.001 0.001 reserve (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.106 -0.246 -0.028 -0.056 -0.225** -0.737* -0.188 -0.683 exdebt (0.12) (0.43) (0.12) (0.39) (0.11) (0.40) (0.13) (0.46) 
0.113 0.128 0.149 0.134 -0.120 -0.445 -0.323 -1.230 totshk (0.34) (1.10) (0.40) (1.21) (0.34) (1.09) (0.34) (1.11) 
0.099 0.394 0.218 0.588 0.175 0.608 0.025 -0.259 monshk (0.25) (1.04) (0.26) (0.94) (0.29) (1.20) (0.30) (1.18) 
0.066 0.046 -0.027 -0.140 -0.054 -0.129 -0.099 -0.290 fd (0.28) (0.85) (0.31) (0.92) (0.28) (0.91) (0.29) (0.99) 
-0.065** -0.197** -0.058* -0.153 -0.016 -0.038 -0.009 -0.011 kaopen (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.12) 
-0.019*** -0.058*** -0.019*** -0.055*** -0.019*** -0.061*** -0.019** -0.068***demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.018 -0.075 -0.006 -0.039 -0.030* -0.116* -0.014 -0.051 polin (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) 
N 927 927 936 936 945 945 722 722 
Wald Chi2 357.4*** 423.7*** 203.6*** 167.9*** 101.8*** 245.5*** 351.2*** 512.5***
Adj. R2 0.227  0.205  0.180  0.271  
Tests of 
exogeneity 0.196 0.294 0.022 0.045 0.609 0.689 0.843 0.887 
First stage results of lagged 10-year diversification on current indicator 
0.549*** 0.549*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.553*** 0.553*** 0.576*** 0.576***intmar_10 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies and 
constant are not reported. 
5.Numbers in the row of “Tests of exogeneity” are p values of DWH test in the 
2sls-LPM and Wald test in the IV probit model respectively.
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Table 4-1 Broader definition the dependent variable (overall indicator) 
RR RR_D  
LPM probit LPM probit 
0.037 0.128 0.046 0.152 exdiv 
(0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.15) 
0.154 0.466 0.162 0.493 open (0.15) (0.43) (0.16) (0.46) 
-0.072 -0.235 -0.080 -0.249 ecodev (0.07) (0.21) (0.07) (0.21) 
-0.019 -0.073 -0.023 -0.082 ecosize (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11) 
-0.406** -1.765*** -0.938** -2.700** inf (0.17) (0.65) (0.37) (1.09) 
-0.009 -0.025 -0.007 -0.021 reserve (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.155 -0.466 -0.135 -0.431 exdebt (0.10) (0.32) (0.12) (0.34) 
-0.200 -0.610 -0.243 -0.797 totshk (0.26) (0.77) (0.27) (0.80) 
0.400 1.574 0.385 1.668 monshk (0.30) (1.12) (0.32) (1.16) 
0.036 0.264 -0.002 0.148 fd (0.27) (0.76) (0.27) (0.77) 
-0.002 -0.000 -0.007 -0.013 kaopen (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
-0.013** -0.041** -0.014** -0.045** demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.031** -0.109* -0.028* -0.101* polin (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
N 1273 1273 1126 1126 
F statistics 3.37***  3.42***  
Adj. R2 0.158  0.162  
Wald Chi2  285.6***  262.3*** 
Pseudo R2  0.143  0.139 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies 
and constant are not reported. 
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Table 4-2 Broader definition the dependent variable (extensive margin) 
RR RR_D  
LPM probit LPM probit 
0.202** 0.609** 0.233** 0.693** extmar 
(0.09) (0.27) (0.10) (0.29) 
0.222 0.668 0.229 0.693 open (0.14) (0.43) (0.15) (0.45) 
-0.098 -0.311 -0.111 -0.339 ecodev (0.07) (0.21) (0.07) (0.21) 
-0.009 -0.051 -0.016 -0.069 ecosize (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
-0.284 -1.477** -0.749** -2.280** inf (0.17) (0.67) (0.35) (1.03) 
-0.008 -0.022 -0.006 -0.016 reserve (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.169* -0.543* -0.164 -0.544 exdebt (0.10) (0.31) (0.11) (0.34) 
-0.051 -0.166 -0.059 -0.284 totshk (0.28) (0.81) (0.29) (0.85) 
0.334 1.442 0.322 1.584 monshk (0.31) (1.14) (0.33) (1.20) 
0.105 0.446 0.094 0.397 fd (0.28) (0.82) (0.29) (0.84) 
0.006 0.025 0.001 0.012 kaopen (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
-0.013** -0.043** -0.014** -0.047** demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.037** -0.129** -0.034** -0.123* polin (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
N 1271 1271 1124 1124 
F statistics 3.75***  5.40***  
Adj. R2 0.187  0.195  
Wald Chi2  289.2***  290.6*** 
Pseudo R2  0.167  0.167 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies 
and constant are not reported. 
 34
Table 4-3 Broader definition the dependent variable (intensive margin) 
RR RR_D  
LPM probit LPM probit 
-0.042 -0.119 -0.042 -0.116 intmar 
(0.05) (0.16) (0.06) (0.17) 
0.174 0.523 0.182 0.547 open (0.15) (0.44) (0.16) (0.46) 
-0.0640 -0.207 -0.0690 -0.218 ecodev (0.07) (0.21) (0.07) (0.22) 
-0.031 -0.108 -0.036 -0.120 ecosize (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
-0.454** -1.910*** -0.982** -2.843*** inf (0.17) (0.68) (0.37) (1.10) 
-0.008 -0.021 -0.006 -0.016 reserve (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.161 -0.488 -0.149 -0.462 exdebt (0.10) (0.32) (0.12) (0.34) 
-0.088 -0.274 -0.124 -0.436 totshk (0.29) (0.83) (0.30) (0.86) 
0.454 1.788 0.475 1.955* monshk (0.31) (1.13) (0.32) (1.18) 
-0.051 -0.011 -0.091 -0.132 fd (0.27) (0.76) (0.27) (0.76) 
-0.006 -0.009 -0.011 -0.022 kaopen (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
-0.015** -0.047** -0.016** -0.051** demo (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
-0.030** -0.104* -0.0260 -0.094 polin (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
N 1273 1273 1126 1126 
F statistics 3.66***  4.14***  
Adj. R2 0.159  0.161  
Wald Chi2  322.3***  283.6*** 
Pseudo R2  0.143  0.137 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies 
and constant are not reported.
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Table 5-1 Fixed effect estimator (overall indicator) 
 SH IMF RR RR_D 
0.598* 0.652* 0.065 0.273 exdiv 
(0.32) (0.34) (0.45) (0.47) 
1.535 -0.612 2.065 2.885 open (1.04) (1.15) (1.65) (1.90) 
-7.479*** 3.359 3.858 -2.797 ecodev (2.43) (2.26) (3.43) (3.94) 
7.368*** 0.201 -11.19*** -5.422 ecosize (2.78) (2.58) (3.95) (4.41) 
-7.851*** -3.330*** -3.824** -4.394 inf (1.77) (1.13) (1.86) (3.22) 
-0.070 0.014 -0.089 -0.167* reserve (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10) 
-0.199 0.371 -1.488** -1.135 exdebt (0.58) (0.54) (0.75) (0.83) 
2.681 -0.433 0.331 1.229 totshk (1.63) (1.52) (2.59) (2.90) 
-1.614 -0.835 -1.248 -1.347 monshk (1.51) (1.63) (1.97) (2.26) 
6.633*** 1.291 8.963*** 12.37*** fd (1.55) (1.41) (2.49) (3.04) 
-0.552*** -0.213 0.307 0.271 kaopen (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.26) 
-0.025 -0.095** -0.299*** -0.619*** demo (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) 
0.177* -0.062 0.562*** 0.904*** polin (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.24) 
N 666 674 542 478 
LR 115.6*** 146.0*** 122.9*** 130.0*** 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Year dummies not reported. 
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Table 5-2 Fixed effect estimator (extensive margin) 
 SH IMF RR RR_D 
1.493** 0.126 2.372** 3.171** extmar 
(0.61) (0.56) (1.09) (1.26) 
2.646** -0.053 4.227** 6.558*** open (1.08) (1.20) (1.77) (2.24) 
-8.955*** 4.582** 3.528 -3.072 ecodev (2.41) (2.26) (3.45) (3.98) 
8.995*** -1.198 -11.06*** -5.560 ecosize (2.75) (2.68) (4.01) (4.45) 
-8.026*** -3.396*** -3.456* -3.276 inf (1.75) (1.13) (1.90) (3.40) 
-0.076* 0.026 -0.112 -0.182* reserve (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) 
-0.421 0.390 -2.191*** -2.149** exdebt (0.57) (0.53) (0.82) (0.92) 
2.777* -0.546 0.036 0.531 totshk (1.63) (1.51) (2.62) (2.98) 
-1.047 -0.683 -1.245 -1.455 monshk (1.54) (1.64) (1.98) (2.28) 
6.223*** 0.864 9.732*** 13.16*** fd (1.51) (1.38) (2.48) (3.04) 
-0.505*** -0.297* 0.446* 0.514* kaopen (0.17) (0.15) (0.23) (0.28) 
-0.024 -0.090** -0.323*** -0.666*** demo (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.14) 
0.136 -0.048 0.496*** 0.875*** polin (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.24) 
N 664 672 542 478 
LR 117.2*** 141.9*** 127.7*** 135.9*** 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Year dummies not reported. 
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Table 5-3 Fixed effect estimator (intensive margin) 
 SH IMF RR RR_D 
0.195 0.968** -0.355 -0.218 intmar 
(0.31) (0.43) (0.45) (0.48) 
1.648 -1.554 2.948 3.716* open (1.08) (1.28) (1.83) (2.10) 
-8.028*** 3.722* 3.809 -2.740 ecodev (2.41) (2.21) (3.46) (3.98) 
8.020*** -0.854 -11.15*** -5.517 ecosize (2.77) (2.45) (4.00) (4.46) 
-8.108*** -3.487*** -3.809** -4.415 inf (1.76) (1.13) (1.86) (3.22) 
-0.064 0.020 -0.086 -0.160 reserve (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10) 
-0.214 0.373 -1.717** -1.332 exdebt (0.57) (0.54) (0.78) (0.86) 
2.795* -0.422 0.044 0.831 totshk (1.63) (1.53) (2.59) (2.90) 
-1.583 -1.005 -1.231 -1.309 monshk (1.51) (1.65) (1.98) (2.27) 
6.149*** 1.532 8.470*** 11.63*** fd (1.50) (1.43) (2.43) (2.96) 
-0.607*** -0.248* 0.297 0.255 kaopen (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.25) 
-0.020 -0.098** -0.300*** -0.624*** demo (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.14) 
0.195* -0.051 0.564*** 0.908*** polin (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.23) 
N 666 674 542 478 
LR 112.3*** 147.4*** 123.5*** 129.4*** 
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Year dummies not reported.
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Table 6-1 Random effect estimator (overall indicator) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit
0.390** 0.790*** 0.336** 0.570* -0.057 -0.028 0.083 0.229 exdiv 
(0.15) (0.28) (0.17) (0.29) (0.21) (0.38) (0.23) (0.47) 
0.637 1.135 -0.227 -0.575 0.979 1.690 1.524* 2.631 open (0.50) (0.88) (0.57) (0.99) (0.72) (1.30) (0.78) (1.85) 
-0.447 -0.864 1.542*** 2.707*** -1.010** -2.168*** -1.582** -3.323***ecodev (0.37) (0.65) (0.45) (0.80) (0.51) (0.80) (0.77) (1.26) 
-0.348 -0.618 -0.792*** -1.363*** -0.934*** -2.135*** -0.741** -1.310**ecosize (0.22) (0.38) (0.27) (0.44) (0.24) (0.37) (0.33) (0.63) 
-3.617*** -6.797*** -1.760*** -3.155*** -2.272*** -5.161*** -2.825* -5.305* inf (0.79) (1.59) (0.56) (1.05) (0.75) (1.69) (1.50) (2.78) 
-0.021 -0.033 0.003 0.015 -0.040 -0.080 -0.060 -0.147* reserve (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) 
-0.165 -0.294 0.167 0.253 -0.735** -1.286* -0.606 -0.830 exdebt (0.30) (0.54) (0.29) (0.51) (0.37) (0.68) (0.40) (0.79) 
0.909 1.708 -0.458 -0.785 0.560 1.102 0.138 0.312 totshk (0.87) (1.54) (0.87) (1.49) (1.23) (2.25) (1.35) (2.57) 
-0.497 -1.216 -0.539 -1.067 -0.997 -1.983 -0.851 -1.817 monshk (0.87) (1.50) (0.93) (1.60) (1.02) (1.85) (1.12) (2.14) 
3.289*** 6.084*** 1.316* 2.248* 4.143*** 8.511*** 5.035*** 10.55***fd (0.75) (1.38) (0.73) (1.29) (1.07) (2.03) (1.27) (2.40) 
-0.272*** -0.479*** -0.108 -0.187 0.069 0.100 0.096 0.169 kaopen (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.18) (0.13) (0.23) 
-0.037* -0.064* -0.057*** -0.102*** -0.131*** -0.266*** -0.238*** -0.518***demo (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
0.102* 0.174* -0.021 -0.036 0.195** 0.399** 0.324*** 0.690***polin (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.19) 
N 1256 1256 1245 1245 1273 1273 1126 1126 
Wald Chi2 93.23*** 85.63*** 120.5*** 111.1*** 108.2*** 108.0*** 93.12*** 117.5***
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies 
and constant are not reported. 
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Table 6-2 Random effect estimator (extensive margin) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit
0.995*** 1.893*** 0.190 0.228 1.292** 2.452** 1.598*** 2.922***extmar 
(0.30) (0.53) (0.27) (0.48) (0.51) (1.15) (0.57) (1.06) 
1.310** 2.478*** 0.016 -0.172 1.844** 3.597** 2.947*** 5.222***open (0.51) (0.90) (0.59) (1.03) (0.85) (1.77) (0.92) (1.78) 
-0.576* -1.103* 1.586*** 2.788*** -1.526*** -2.905** -1.962*** -4.012***ecodev (0.35) (0.61) (0.45) (0.80) (0.57) (1.32) (0.56) (1.17) 
-0.274 -0.467 -0.799*** -1.400*** -0.666** -1.262 -0.633 -1.245* ecosize (0.20) (0.36) (0.26) (0.45) (0.33) (0.83) (0.46) (0.64) 
-3.606*** -6.683*** -1.806*** -3.289*** -1.962** -4.748*** -2.388 -4.251 inf (0.79) (1.57) (0.57) (1.06) (0.78) (1.76) (1.58) (2.80) 
-0.021 -0.031 0.006 0.022 -0.048 -0.098 -0.064 -0.149* reserve (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) 
-0.364 -0.659 0.195 0.321 -1.067*** -1.869** -1.082** -1.902**exdebt (0.30) (0.53) (0.29) (0.51) (0.40) (0.74) (0.43) (0.87) 
0.989 1.816 -0.400 -0.696 0.680 1.176 0.155 0.566 totshk (0.84) (1.50) (0.87) (1.48) (1.22) (2.25) (1.56) (2.50) 
-0.146 -0.556 -0.490 -0.958 -1.079 -2.053 -0.956 -2.075 monshk (0.88) (1.52) (0.94) (1.60) (1.04) (1.89) (1.14) (2.14) 
2.930*** 5.198*** 1.098 1.900 4.814*** 8.993*** 5.508*** 11.14***fd (0.72) (1.30) (0.72) (1.27) (1.15) (2.52) (1.22) (2.36) 
-0.219*** -0.384*** -0.139* -0.244* 0.156 0.259 0.202 0.336 kaopen (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) (0.23) (0.13) (0.25) 
-0.041** -0.074** -0.058*** -0.104*** -0.141*** -0.284*** -0.259*** -0.543***demo (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) 
0.075 0.122 -0.019 -0.027 0.169** 0.321* 0.305*** 0.617***polin (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10) (0.19) 
N 1253 1253 1242 1242 1271 1271 1124 1124 
Wald Chi2 96.62*** 89.49*** 120.0*** 110.8*** 85.24*** 64.09*** 128.8*** 104.1***
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies 
and constant are not reported. 
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Table 6-3 Random effect estimator (intensive margin) 
SH IMF RR RR_D  
RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit RE probit RE Logit
0.136 0.286 0.389* 0.712** -0.342 -0.602 -0.212 -0.338 intmar 
(0.15) (0.27) (0.21) (0.36) (0.22) (0.43) (0.25) (0.48) 
0.719 1.236 -0.494 -1.110 1.558* 3.095** 2.042** 3.402* open (0.52) (0.91) (0.60) (1.06) (0.81) (1.57) (0.86) (2.03) 
-0.444 -0.837 1.580*** 2.773*** -1.267** -2.686*** -1.682** -3.675***ecodev (0.37) (0.65) (0.46) (0.81) (0.57) (1.00) (0.70) (1.27) 
-0.376* -0.670* -0.881*** -1.535*** -0.819*** -1.430** -0.747** -1.641**ecosize (0.22) (0.38) (0.28) (0.46) (0.19) (0.72) (0.38) (0.77) 
-3.694*** -6.966*** -1.916*** -3.435*** -2.282*** -5.248*** -2.917* -5.200* inf (0.79) (1.57) (0.56) (1.05) (0.76) (1.79) (1.52) (2.85) 
-0.017 -0.024 0.006 0.021 -0.037 -0.078 -0.053 -0.122 reserve (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
-0.179 -0.297 0.201 0.301 -0.901** -1.457** -0.742* -1.203 exdebt (0.30) (0.53) (0.29) (0.51) (0.38) (0.69) (0.41) (0.77) 
0.990 1.834 -0.489 -0.840 0.425 0.554 0.018 0.508 totshk (0.87) (1.54) (0.89) (1.51) (1.26) (2.36) (1.42) (2.60) 
-0.479 -1.125 -0.548 -1.103 -1.039 -1.917 -0.869 -1.739 monshk (0.87) (1.49) (0.94) (1.61) (1.04) (1.90) (1.13) (2.14) 
2.990*** 5.401*** 1.368* 2.367* 3.989*** 7.975*** 4.777*** 9.695***fd (0.74) (1.34) (0.73) (1.30) (1.11) (2.12) (1.33) (2.55) 
-0.296*** -0.534*** -0.136* -0.234* 0.063 0.122 0.084 0.130 kaopen (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.20) (0.12) (0.23) 
-0.037* -0.064* -0.057*** -0.101*** -0.132*** -0.271*** -0.243*** -0.521***demo (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) 
0.114** 0.199** -0.015 -0.026 0.194** 0.403** 0.328*** 0.684***polin (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10) (0.20) 
N 1256 1256 1245 1245 1273 1273 1126 1126 
Wald Chi2 90.34*** 83.56*** 118.3*** 109.0*** 97.77*** 67.89*** 91.13*** 77.92***
Note: 1.The dependent variable, EER, equals 1 if fixer, and zero otherwise.  
2.*, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
3.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.  
4.Dummies for landlocked countries and colonial origin, year dummies 
and constant are not reported. 
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Table A1 Country coverage 
Albania Colombia Latvia Peru 
Algeria Congo, Dem. Rep. Lithuania Philippines 
Argentina Congo, Rep. Macedonia, FYR Romania 
Armenia Costa Rica Madagascar Russian Federation 
Azerbaijan Cote d'Ivoire Malaysia Senegal 
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Mali South Africa 
Belarus Ecuador Mauritania Sri Lanka 
Benin Egypt, Arab Rep. Mauritius Sudan 
Bolivia El Salvador Mexico 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Brazil Gabon Moldova Tanzania 
Bulgaria Gambia, The Morocco Thailand 
Burkina Faso Guatemala Mozambique Togo 
Burundi Honduras Nepal Tunisia 
Cameroon India Nicaragua Turkey 
Cape Verde Indonesia Pakistan Uganda 
Central African 
Republic Jordan Panama Ukraine 
Chad Kazakhstan Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
China Kenya Paraguay Zambia 
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Table A2 Data sources 
Variables Definition and Sources 
Dependent variables 
RR Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classifications http://www.carmenreinhart.com 
SH Shambaugh (2004) 
IMF The IMF classification http://www.carmenreinhart.com 
Independent variables 
exdiv Overall index of export diversification https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/dfidimf/diversification.htm 
extmar Extensive margin of export diversification https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/dfidimf/diversification.htm 
intmar Intensive margin of export diversification https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/dfidimf/diversification.htm 
Control variables 
OCA factors 
Trade openness (open) (Exports+imports)/GDP, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Economic development 
(ecodev) 
The log of GDP per capital (in PPP) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Economic size (ecosize) The log of GDP (in PPP) World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Macro economic and external factor 
Inflation CPI/(1+CPI), WDI 
International reserve WDI 
External debt WDI 
Real shocks standard deviation of the logarithm of terms of trade over the previous five years, WDI 
Monetary shocks standard deviation of the growth rate of broad money supply in the previous five years, WDI 
Financial development Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions/GDP, World Bank 
Capital account openness De jure capital account openness of Chinn and Ito (2006) http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
Political factors 
Democracy (demo) Polity IV Indicator of democracy; http://www.systemicpeace.org 
Political instability (polin) Political instability indicator; http://www.systemicpeace.org 
Dummy variables 
Landlocked 1=landlocked country, 0, otherwise. CIA World Fact Book.  
Colonial origin 
0=never colonized by a western overseas colonial power; 1=Dutch; 
2=Spanish; 3=Italian; 4=U.S.; 5=British; 6=French; 7=Portuguese; 
8=Belgian; 9=British-French; 10=Australian. The QOG dataset 
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Table A3 Descriptive statistics 
 peg_rr peg_imf peg_sh exdiv extmar intmar open ecodev ecosize inf reserve exdebt totshk monshk kaopen fd demo polin 
Mean 0.336 0.471 0.400 3.498 0.587 2.912 0.648 7.980 24.37 0.120 4.793 0.562 0.153 0.880 -0.306 0.231 1.698 0.994 
Sd. 0.472 0.499 0.489 0.988 0.591 0.798 0.317 0.892 1.707 0.149 4.480 0.368 0.102 0.091 1.352 0.156 6.56 1.923 
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.702 -0.045 1.451 0.091 5.711 19.83 -0.150 0.864 0.074 0.000 0.213 -1.864 0.016 -10.00 0.000 
Max. 1.000 1.000 1.000 6.084 2.826 5.862 1.988 9.776 28.96 0.992 30.79 2.230 1.122 1.000 2.439 0.764 10.00 10.00 
Correlation matrix 
peg_rr 1.00                  
peg_imf 0.53*** 1.00                 
peg_sh 0.66*** 0.59*** 1.00                
exdiv 0.22** 0.34*** 0.26*** 1.00               
extmar 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.59*** 1.00              
intmar 0.07*** 0.15*** 0.09* 0.80*** -0.01* 1.00             
open 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.07*** -0.19*** 0.22*** 1.00            
ecodev -0.16*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.42*** -0.33*** -0.27*** 0.23*** 1.00           
ecosize -0.27*** -0.38*** -0.29*** -0.54*** -0.35*** -0.40*** -0.34*** 0.48*** 1.00          
inf -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.29*** -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.22*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 1.00         
reserve -0.02 0.08*** 0.03 -0.00 0.04* -0.03 -0.10*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.08*** 1.00        
exdebt -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.19*** -0.27*** -0.32*** 0.04* 0.07*** 1.00       
totshk 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.19*** -0.01 0.24*** 0.06** -0.06** -0.03 0.09*** 0.00 0.03 1.00      
monshk 0.09*** 0.03 0.02 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.04* 0.06** -0.21*** 0.29*** -0.10*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 1.00     
kaopen 0.03 -0.14*** -0.06** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.14*** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.05* -0.19*** -0.15*** -0.07*** -0.04* -0.00 1.00    
fd -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.24*** 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.24*** -0.16*** 0.17*** -0.06*** -0.14*** -0.32*** 0.19*** 1.00   
demo -0.21*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.22*** 0.09*** 0.27*** 0.13*** 0.06*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.00 0.20*** 0.04* 1.00  
polin -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.07** 0.05** -0.13*** -0.30*** -0.13*** 0.34*** 0.05** 0.04* -0.08* 0.00 -0.21*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.00 1.00 
Note: *, **and ***denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
